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RATEMAKING: THE MECHANICS OF REGULATION
Once a governmental body attempts to regulate an industry, the governing
agency must determine how the regulation will be effectuated. In the area of
utilities, the method of regulation is the control of rates charged and the
resulting revenues; therefore, ratemaking is a crucial element in the scheme
of regulation. Without proper rate setting techniques, regulation is of little
value.
The Texas Legislature realized that most areas are served by only one
utility, thus resembling a monopoly; the result was the passage of the new
Public Utility Regulatory Act. 1 8 The single utility operation creates a
situation of potential abuse by utilities which are thrust into the role of

monopolies. 119 Regulation attempts to prevent abuse and artificially imposes

the favorable effects of a competitive market system. 1 20 As is the case with
most utilities, a monopoly may be the most advantageous business form.
Economies of scale are the primary factors which make a monopoly desirable, 12 ' this is because the high cost of equipment makes it more profitable to
both consumers and the utility for only one firm to exist. 122 By recognizing
that utilities are actually "natural monopolies," the legislature set the stage
118. Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 721, § 2, at 2327-28 provides:

mhe legislature finds that public utilities are by definition monopolies in the areas
they serve; that therefore the normal

forces of competition which operate to regulate prices in a free enterprise society do not operate; and that therefore utility
rates, operations and services are regulated by public agencies, with the objective
that such regulation shall operate as a substitute for such competition ....
If taken literally and interpreted to mean that the Public Utility Regulatory Act created
a monopoly in each city or area, this clause could render the entire Act unconstitutional
for Article I, Section 26 of the Texas Constitution states that "[m]onopolies are contrary to the genius of the free government, and shall never be allowed .... ." Every
state court and agency was specifically prohibited from creating a monopoly by Gerst
v. Cain, 379 S.W.2d 699, 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964), af 'd, 388 S.W.2d 168
(Tex. 1965). Municipalities may create their own utility companies, but they may not
vest the company with exclusive operating rights. City of Mason v. West Tex. Util. Co.,
150 Tex. 18, 27, 237 S.W.2d 273, 279 (1951); Lea County Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Plains,
373 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The legislature
has not, however, created a monopoly. It has simply acknowledged, in the statute, that
because of economic factors utilities usually do not compete for markets.
119. The power of a monopoly to set prices at a rate which is self-determined and
usually higher than that of firms in a competitive economy is the primary reason for
regulation. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427-28 (2d Cir.
1945); accord, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813-14 (1946).
120. Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 721, § 2, at 2327-28; accord, City of Chicago v. FPC, 385

F.2d 629, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
121. C. PHILLIPs,
122. Id. at 21-23.

THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
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for regulation by the new Public Utility Commission ;128 proper setting of
rates now becomes the most important concern.
RATE LEVEL

Valuation Theories
Basic to the determination of reasonable utility rates is the valuation of the
utility's property, and a choice of property to be included in the rate
calculations. Almost any case involving rates will include a question of
whether the utility property has been properly valued. ,For years, there has
been judicial conflict as to which of several methods is the correct and best
valuation method. 124 Two major theories were either advanced or condemned between 1898 and 1944. The United States Supreme Court in
Smyth v. Ames1 25 promulgated the theory that a utility is entitled to a "fair
return" on the "fair value" of property devoted to serving the public. 126 On
the other hand, Justice 'Brandeis, dissenting in a later case, advocated the
"prudent investment" theory.' 27 Rather than allowing a return on the value
of property in service, the "prudent investment" theory allows only a return
on the capital honestly and prudently invested by the utility. 128 The theory
was intended to preclude utilities from overvaluing their assets in order to
obtain an excessive rate base and thus a higher return. 129 Prudent investment is the stricter of the two tests and may in fact arrive at a value below
the utilities' book value if the commission determined that a utility manipulated its figures or made an imprudently high investment simply to inflate the
rate base. Prudent investment fails to account for inflation which is encompassed by the "fair value" theory allowing the utility to include rising
replacement costs in its rate base.'8 0 This factor is especially important to
prevent the erosion of asset value by inflation.
123. Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 721, § 2, at 2327-28.
124. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 155 Tex. 502, 51022, 289 S.W.2d 559, 564-71 (1956); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. ComIm'n,
152 P.2d 542, 546-53 (Utah 1944). See also Priest, The Public Utility Rate Base, 51
IOWA L. REV. 283-303 (1966).

125. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
126. Id. at 546-47. Proper valuation of a utility is to be the fair value of property
used for the convenience of the public. Factors to consider when computing the fair
value are: (1) original cost, (2) probable earning capacity, (3) amount spent on perma-

nent improvements, (4) amount and market valuation of stocks and bonds, (5) present
cost of construction, and (6) the sum required to meet operating expenses. Each of
these factors should be weighted due to the circumstances of each case. Id. at 546-47.

127. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.

276, 289-90 (1923).

"The thing devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific

property, tangible and intangible, but capital embarked in the enterprise." Id. at 290.
128. Id. at 289-92. Because the value is limited to capital honestly and prudently
invested, it could conceivably be less than the book value--original cost-if the commission found that the utility had made an imprudent investment.
129. Id. at 290 (dissenting opinion).
130. See Smythe v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898). The Supreme Court attempted
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The major criticism of "fair value" is the difficulty of arriving at a proper
figure.' 3 ' In addition, the question of whether the property should be valued
13 2
at its original or reproduction cost has perplexed "fair value" jurisdictions.
In 1956, the Texas Supreme Court resolved both problems of whether to
adhere to "prudent investment" or "fair value," and whether to value at
original or reproduction cost. 1 33 The prudent investment theory was summarily dismissed as an improper valuation theory in Texas, not because fault
was found in the theory itself, but the court noted that existing statutes
required the use of "fair value."13 The court was careful to point out that
its holding was based solely upon legislative delegation, and not on a
weakness in the merits of either theory; 3 5 as a result the legislature could
modify its approach at any future time. As to the question of which property
value to use-original or replacement cost-the court expressed the opinion
1 36
that a ratio of the two was proper.
The recently enacted Public Utility Regulatory Act embodies the ratio
concept, the only modification being the actual percentages used in the
ratio." 7 Under the Act, 60 to 75 percent of the utility's valuation will be
based upon the original cost of the property; the remainder will be based
upon the property's replacement cost."38 This figure represents a compromise which actually may prove equitable to both consumers and utilities;139
for when a value is computed using purely original or reproduction cost it
creates an adverse condition for the parties, depending upon an economic
to resolve the controversy between these two theories in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591 (1944), stating that either valuation method would be adequate if it resulted in a just and reasonable rate. Id. at 602. The Court emphasized that the end
product would be examined rather than the means by which it was reached. Id. at 602.
Legal scholars used this opportunity to propose what they felt was the best method. See
generally, Ferguson, "Cost" as a Substitute for "Value" in Utility Rate Base Determination: A Comment on Dr. Bauer's Position, 53 YALE L.J. 721 (1944); Hunt & Legg,
Public Utility Rates in Illinois: The Bell Cases, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 17 (1955); Rose,
The Hope Case and Public Utility Valuation in the States, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 188

(1954).
131. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
276, 292 (1923) (dissenting opinion); see Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas
Co., 155 Tex. 502, 516-20, 289 S.W.2d 559, 568-70 (1956).

132. For an explanation of how "fair value" has changed in its application since

Smyth v. Ames, see Ferguson, "Cost" as a Substitute for "Value" in Utility Rate Base
Determination: A Comment on Dr. Bauer's Position, 53 YALE L.J. 721 (1944); Priest,
The Public Utility Rate Base, 51 IowA L. REV. 283, 283-303 (1966).

133. Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 155 Tex. 502, 289 S.W.2d 559
(1956).
134. Id. at 521, 289 S.W.2d at 571.
135. Id. at 521, 289 S.W.2d at 571.
136. Id. at 523, 289 S.W.2d at 572.

137. Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 721, § 41(a), at 2341-42.

See also Alsup, Should the

Texas Legislature Calm the Clamor for a State Utility Commission by Establishing
One?, 16 S. TEx. L.J. 127, 147-48 (1975).
138. Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 721, § 41(a), at 2341-42.
139. THE TEXAS OBSERVER, VOL. LXVII, No. 12, June 20, 1975, at 10-11.
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upswing or downturn. 140 For example, during an inflationary period of
rising equipment costs, the use of original cost causes the utility to base its
rate of return on an abnormally low figure which will result in lower
revenues and will unduly penalize the utility. Conversely, during a recession
when prices are falling, original cost valuation would result in an excessively
high valuation of utility property. Rates based upon this high value result in
excessive revenues to the utility and thus benefit the utility as a windfall
while burdening the consumer with artificially high rates. 1 41 A ratio combining both original and replacement cost is, therefore, very advantageous
because it tends to stabilize the unsettling effects that economic cycles have
42
upon rates.'
Property Included in the Rate Base

The proper valuation method is of little use if it is applied to the wrong
property; it is thus necessary to determine what property to include in the

rate base. On the one hand, utilities will want to include all of their property
in order to have the largest possible rate base, while on the other hand, the

regulatory commission will endeavor to exclude as much property as possi-

ble. 1 43 The difficulty is that no specific guidelines have been established by

the courts.144 As a general rule, only property "used and useful in the
service to the public" may be included in the rate base.' 45 This has been
adopted by the legislature and embodied in the Public Utility Regulatory
Act,'1 4 but the task of determining the specific exclusions has been

delegated to the Public Utility Commission.'

47

In the past, courts have

allowed depreciation, maintenance expenses, costs of expanding services, and
advertising and selling expenses to the extent that the court finds them

reasonable.1 48 The inclusion of charitable contributions, however, would be

140. Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 155 Tex. 502, 523, 289 S.W.2d
559, 572 (1956).
141. Id. at 523, 289 S.W.2d at 572. Rose, The Hope Case and Public Utility Valua-

tion in the States, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 188, 189-90 (1954).

142. Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 155 Tex. 502, 523, 289 S.W.2d
559, 572 (1956).
143. Mello, Public Utility Rate Increases: A Practice Manual for Administrative
Litigation, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 411, 412, 414 (1974).
144. In City of Baytown v. General Tel. Co., 256 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.) the court stated that the utility may expect a reasonable
return on the "value of the property then being used to render public service ....
Id. at 193. Capital charges were included, but limited to a rate which would ensure
confidence in the utility and allow the utility to raise money to enable it to render proper
service. Id. at 193-94.
145. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 75 F.2d 880, 882 (5th Cir.
1935); see Denver Union Stockyard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1938).
146. Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 721, § 40(a), at 2341.
147. Id. § 41(c)(3), at 2342.
148. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935) (advertising); Transworld Airways v. CAB, 385 F.2d 648, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (advertising expenses);

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol7/iss3/6

4

McMahon: Ratemaking: The Mechanics of Regulation Student Symposium - Publi

19751 '

9STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

open to question since it is arguable as to whether it is necessary to provide
service to the public.' 49 Any non-recurring expense should definitely be
excluded because of the tendency to distort the rate base.' 50
An important consideration when large interrelated corporate entities are
involved is the purchase of equipment from an affiliate. 15' When an affiliate
is allowed to sell goods to the utility at an inflated price, both will benefit if
the utility is permitted to pass along the inflated price as part of its rate
base.' 52 If the affiliate is unregulated, it will probably have a higher rate of
return than the regulated utility, and will thus benefit the utility. 5 8 California has solved this problem by combining the utility and its affiliates into one
group; the affiliate is allowed no higher rate of return than the utility.154
The Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act attempts to alleviate the problem of
affiliate sales somewhat differently by requiring the commission to examine
such sales to determine whether or not they are reasonable, and set
reasonable compensation. 155 This procedure, coupled with the California
approach should eliminate abuse by affiliates because of their relationship
with the regulated utility.
The new Act also excludes certain income tax benefits from the rate
base.' 56 Generally, if the utility is a member of an amalgamation or
affiliated group which is permitted to file a consolidated income tax return,
the company will be prohibited from including the full amount of its taxes if
it files a separate return; such an exclusion occurs only if the consolidated
return would result in a lower tax liability. 157 Also, an investment tax credit
retained by the company may result in a lowering of a rate base.' 55 These
City of Weslaco v. General Tel. Co., 359 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-San An-

tonio 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (depreciation); Bexar County v. City of San Antonio, 352

S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961, writ dism'd) (maintenance and

expansion).

149. Mello, Public Utility Rate Increases: A Practice Manual for Administrative
Litigation, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 411, 413 (1974).
150. City of Houston v. Memorial Bend Util. Co., 331 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
151. This situation is impliedly treated in Tex. Laws 1975, eh. 721, § 41(c)(1), at
2342, and in the decision of City of Los Angeles v. Public Util. Comm'n, 102 Cal. Rptr.
313, 323 (1972).
152. City of Los Angeles v. Public Util. Comm'n, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313, 323 (1972).
153. Id. at 323. When the two rates of return are averaged and considered as one,
the higher rate of the nonregulated affiliate will raise the utility's return. Id. at 323.
154. Id. at 323. For a similar approach in the federal courts, see General Tel. Co.
v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 855 (5th Cir. 1971).

155. Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 721, § 41(c)(1), at 2342. The Public Utility Commission
is given the power to investigate records of the utility's affiliates as well as the power

to require the utility to disclose the name of holders of substantial portions of securities.
Id. §§ 67, 68, at 2348-49.
156. Id. § 41(c)(2), at 2342.
157. Id. § 41(c)(2), at 2342.
158. Id.§ 41(c)(2), at 2342.
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pertinent sections of the Act require the utility to take advantage of the most
efficient business practices and the Act further attempts to neutralize any
possible abuse of corporate affiliations. By application of these requirements,
the commission should enable the consumer to secure the best possible
service while the utility is encouraged to operate in the most efficient
manner.
Test Year
Since rates are intended to reflect normal business needs of a utility, it is
important to choose a period of operations for base values which is representative of normal business conditions. 15 9 This period is referred to as a
"test year," although it may include a period of several years. 1 60 The Public
Utility Regulatory Act establishes the test year as the 12-month period
immediately preceding the rate inquiry.' 6 While this is a simple measure to
administer, it has a great potential for improper rate setting. In fact, the
Act's definition of test year conflicts with existing case law, where,
according to the United States Supreme Court, a proper test period should
consist of not one but several years.' 62 In West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission,' 3 Justice Cardozo stated that "the adoption of a
single year as an exclusive test or standard imposed upon the company an
arbitrary restriction in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment and of
'the rudiments of fair play' made necessary thereby."' 64 Although more
difficult to determine, a period of years averaged and adjusted to show
trends is more suitable than an arbitrary period such as the last preceding
year.
Rate of Return
Rates charged by a utility should permit a company to recover its
operating expenses and also to receive a reasonable return on its invested
capital.' 6 5 The United States Supreme Court in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas
Co.' 66 established general rules as to what constitutes a reasonable return:
159. Mello, Public Utility Rate Increases: A Practice Manual for Administrative Litigation, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 411, 412 (1974); see Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.
v. FPC,263 F.2d 553, 555 (6th Cir. 1959).
160. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 79, 81-82 (1935); Mello,
Public Utility Rate Increases: A Practice Manual for Administrative Litigation, 8
CLEARINGHOUSE REV.

411, 412 (1974).

161. Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 721, § 3(t), at 2330.

162. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 79, 81 (1935); United
Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. State, 89 S.W.2d 1094, 1100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, writ
ref'd), aff'd, 303 U.S. 123 (1938).

163. 294 U.S. 79 (1935).
164. Id. at 81.

165. Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 721, § 39, at 2341.
166. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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one sufficient to service the debts
increment to secure confidence in
tors. 167 Section 39 of the new Act
by comparing the utility's return
area.

168

and operating costs with an additional
the corporation and attract new invesincorporates basically the same standard
with similar utilities operating in the

Of paramount concern is that the rate be nonconfiscatory; that is, not so
low as to constitute a taking of utility property without compensation and
therefore a violation of due process.' 69 The issue of confiscation is often
difficult to determine, because due to changing conditions, what is reasonable
at one time may quickly become confiscatory under an altered economic
environment.' 70 Another complication is that a distinction must be made
between confiscation due to changed conditions and losses due simply to
poor business judgment by utility management. A public utility commission
may not be compelled to set a rate which provides profits and thereby
reward poor management.' 71 A reasonable rate for services, therefore, may
not always ensure that the utility will have a net profit, 172 for there is no
automatic assurance ;that a utility will be profitable. On the other hand, a
commission is not required to set rates at a level which barely covers costs,
for a reasonable return may be much higher.' 7 ' This is supported by the fact
that the return must be sufficient to attract new capital in order that the
174
utility may continually improve its services.
The recent energy shortage has emphasized another reason for setting
rates substantially higher than the confiscatory level. A utility serves the
public interest by supplying an adequate source of energy; to maintain this
service it must have an incentive to expand its operations. In the case of gas
utilities, there must be an incentive for exploration and expansion of
167. Id. at 603.
168. Id. at 603.
169. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Great N. Util. Co., 289 U.S. 130, 135 (1933).
170. Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U.S. 413, 422 (1925); Lincoln Gas & Elec. Light
Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256, 268 (1919); Fort Worth Gas Co. v. City of Fort
Worth, 35 F.2d 743, 746 (N.D. Tex. 1929).
171. See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Great N. Util. Co., 289 U.S. 130, 135 (1933).
172. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). But see Joslin &
Miller, Public Utility Regulation: A Re-examination, 43 VA. L. REv. 1027, 1070-71
(1957).
173. Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U.S. 413, 422-23 (1925).
174. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). An investor will
put his money into a venture only if he can make a profit. Some investments being
more risky than others, the investor will demand a higher return to balance the increased risk, therefore, a utility must offer the investor a return which ensures him a
profit and also compensates him for the risk involved in the investment. Without this
increment added to the return which the utilities' securities produce, no new money other
than profits generated by the utilities' operations would be available for expansion and
improvements, and because of the high cost of equipment and construction, the utilities
internally generated profits alone would be inadequate to finance significant expansion
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reserves. 17 5 Therefore, a reasonable rate must balance the customers' desire
for the lowest possible rates against the utility's need to continually improve
service to the community through constant expansion and improvement. 1 76
This balance may shift towards the utility in a time of shortage because of an
177
even greater need for expansion of the utility's capacity.
The financial structure of the utility is another factor in rate setting. A rate
of return which is reasonable for a utility funded entirely by equity would be
markedly different from one funded solely by debt.' 78 The discrepancy
originates from differences in the costs of the two sources of capital.
Generally, debt financing is cheaper than equity financing; however, it is
necessary for the corporation to combine both sources of capital. 179 Optimum
financial structure depends upon the individual company and the industry in
which it operates.' 8 0 Thus, the proper ratio of debt to equity depends upon
many special circumstances, and is a question of fact to be determined from
expert testimony. 18' The cost of debt and equity, and the ratio in which they
are combined will yield the total cost of capital of the utility.' 82 This too will
vary greatly from firm to firm and if the value of its components must be
established by expert testimony, so should the total cost of capital.
or improvements. See P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS, & G. DONALDSON, BASIC BUSINESS FiNANCE 195-96 (4th ed. 1971).
175. Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880, 894-95 n.13 (5th Cir. 1973); El Paso
Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1960).
176. Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880, 894-95 n.13 (5th Cir. 1973).
177. Id. at 895 n.13.
178. Only in theory would a company be funded solely by debt capital.
179. Using debt capital allows the utility to take advantage of the beneficial effects
of leverage. After a certain point, however, debt becomes too costly because the fixed
repayment schedule forces the company to maintain a steady stream of revenues. If the
utility has high debt payments and the economy begins to slump, then it is likely that
the company's revenues will not be sufficient to service the debt. The company will
become insolvent. See Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 155 Tex. 502,
524, 289 S.W.2d 559, 573 (1956) (utility's basic sources of capital); P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS, & G. DONALDSON, BASIC BUSINESS FINANCE 345-420 (4th ed. 1971). See generally Rose, "Cost of Capital" in Public Utility Rate Regulation, 43 VA. L. REv. 1079
(1957).
180. Utilities are known for the stability of their revenues because the demand for
their services remains fairly constant irrespective of general economic conditions. Utilities, therefore, generally have a higher percentage of debt in their capital structures than
do manufacturing firms whose revenues are more volatile.
181. San Antonio Transit Co. v. City of San Antonio, 323 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex.
Civ. App.--San Antonio 1959, no writ).
182. The following four steps are used in calculating the weighted (average) cost of
capital:
1. Determine the cost of each type of financing-bank loans, bonds, common stock,
preferred stock, etc.
2. Figure what percentage each source of financing is to the entire capital structure.
3. Multiply the cost times the percentage.
4. Add the sums to get the weighted cost of capital.
For an example of this calculation, assume that the following pertain to Utility Corp.
A-Z:

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol7/iss3/6
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After determining what amount of revenue a utility is entitled to receive, it
is necessary to determine what fraction of this total each customer will pay.
The breakdown of charges into various classifications is termed the rate
structure.' 8 3 Ideally, the utility would interview each customer to determine
his particular needs and ability to pay, but reason and cost dictate that
classifications be established with customers in each classification being
charged the same rate.18 4 As with almost any case where classifications are
involved, the problem of discrimination arises.
Utilites are allowed to discriminate against customers only to the extent
that the utility may establish classifications.' 8 5 Texas courts have held that
not all classification discrimination is illegal, only those which are arbitrary
and without a reasonable basis, 18 6 that is, a difference in material billing
factors.' 87 Material billing factors are many and varied; they are not always
based upon economic differences of cost.' 88 Major considerations include
the cost, quantity, and character of services received, the time of delivery,
and any other substantial differences.'8 9 If there is a reasonable ground for
the classification it should remain, 190 but in no case may a utility charge
TYPE OF FINANCING

COST

DOLLAR AMOUNT

% OF WHOLE

WEIGHT

Bank Loans
Bonds
Common Stock
Preferred Stock

8%
10%
15%
12%

$1,000,000
5,000,000
3,000,000
1,000,000

10%
50%
30%
10%

.008
.05
.45
.012

100%

.070

10,000,000
WEIGHTED COST OF CAPITAL =

P.

HUNT, C. WILLIAMS,

& G.

DONALDSON,

BASIC

7%

BUSINESS

FINANCE

192-95 (4th ed.

1971).
183.

See generally Mello, Public Utility Rate Increases: A Practice Manual for
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 411, 416-19 (1974).
184. Id. at 417.
185. See Railroad Comm'n v. Weld & Neville, 96 Tex. 394, 410, 73 S.W. 529, 534
(1903).
186. Caldwell v. City of Abilene, 260 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1953, writ ref'd); see Railroad Comm'n v. Weld & Neville, 96 Tex. 394, 406-407, 73
S.W. 529, 532-33 (1903); Riverside, Inc. v. Gulf States Util. Co., 289 S.W.2d 945, 947
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. Ford v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 141 Tex. 525, 527, 174 S.W.2d 479, 480
(1943).
188. Caldwell v. City of Abilene, 260 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1953, writ ref'd).
189. Gillam v. City of Fort Worth, 287 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
190. Botkin v. City of Abilene, 262 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (use of city residents' tax payments to finance utility bonds
which paid for a water plant; non-residents made no tax payments). Some examples
of reasonable grounds for a classification are: (1) lower rates to canneries using large
quantities of gas, Ford v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 141 Tex. 525, 174 S.W.2d 479
(1943); (2) lower rates to industrial users whose gas could be cut off on very short
notice, Wolf v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 77 S.W.2d 1091 (Tex. Civ. App.-San An-
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different rates to similarly situated customers who receive comparable

services.191
Rate discrimination may also be based on widely varying factors, including non-economic public policy considerations. 1 92 Utilities may base classifications upon any matter which creates a substantial difference between
customers. 1 98 In Ford v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co.,'9 4 public policy
reasons were used to justify the classification of canneries as industrial users
while alloting a laundry another classification. The city was attempting to
spur the growth of the canning industry in the area by offering lower rates to
canneries located in an industrial district and using large volumes of gas. The
Texas Supreme Court held this to be a valid classification, reasoning that an
attempt to bring in new industry by offering special rates was a valid
material billing factor.195
Cases involving non-residents served by municipal utilites are numerous
and have reached what seem to be conflicting conclusions. Some cases hold
that a city may not charge non-residents higher rates, 196 while others hold
that classifications may be based upon city limits. 197 In each case where the
classification was valid, the court found that some corresponding factor
caused the cost of servicing non-residents to be higher.198 Thus, municipal
tonio 1934, writ dism'd); Cock v. Marshall Gas Co., 226 S.W. 464 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1920, no writ); (3) lower rates for electricity used for power rather than
incidental lighting, Kousal v. Texas Power & Light Co., 142 Tex. 451, 179 S.W.2d 283
(1944); (4) lower rates for hotels than apartments, Caldwell v. City of Abilene, 260
S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, writ ref'd); and (5) higher rates due to
the provision of fire protection outside city limits, Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San
Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
191. Hatten v. City of Houston, 373 S.W.2d 525, 537 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bexar County v. City of San Antonio, 352 S.W.2d 905, 90910 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961, writ dism'd); City of Kermit v. Rush, 351 S.W.
2d 598, 599-600 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1961, no writ).
192. See Railroad Comm'n v. Weld & Neville, 96 Tex. 394, 408-409, 73 S.W.2d 529,
533-34 (1903).
193. Kousal v. Texas Power & Light Co., 142 Tex. 451, 458, 179 S.W.2d 283, 286
(1944) (incidental lighting); Caldwell v. City of Abilene, 260 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, writ ref'd) (apartment); Wolf v. United Gas Public Serv.
Co., 77 S.W.2d 1091, 1094 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1934, writ dism'd) (industrial
users).
194. 141 Tex. 525, 174 S.W.2d 479 (1943).
195. Id. at 528, 174 S.W.2d at 481.
196. Wiggins v. City of Texarkana, 239 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1951); aff'd, 151 Tex. 100, 246 S.W.2d 622 (1952); Dallas Power & Light Co.
v. Carrington, 245 S.W. 1046, 1050 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1922, writ ref'd w.o.j.).
197. Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gillam v. City of Fort Worth, 287 S.W.2d
494, 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bot-kin v. City of Abilene, 262 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
198. Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (higher cost to provide non-residents with
fire protection); Botkin v. City of Abilene, 262 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
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boundaries alone cannot be considered material billing factors, but if the
utility can show other related expenses which make service to non-residents
more expensive, then city limits may be used to establish valid classifications.
One of the primary material billing factors is the time at which the service
is delivered, 199 and utilities have used this factor to encourage "off peak"
consumption. 200 Since a utility must promptly fill its customers' needs for
service, the utility should be prepared to supply peak needs on any day of
the year and at any hour; therefore, utilities operate at their full capacity
only intermittently. 201 This practice leads to waste of facilities and inefficiency. To partially remedy this problem, utilities may offer lower rates for
consumption during the period of late evening until early morning. This
encourages industrial consumers to make use of their facilities at night when
demand from the residential sector is low. Demand is thereby averaged to a
20 2
lower level which allows the utility to operate more efficiently.
The Public Utility Regulatory Act makes no specific mention of rate
structure other than "every rate . . . shall be just and reasonable . . . [and]
shall not be unreasonably preferential, prejudicial, or discriminatory, but
shall be sufficient, equitable, and consistent in application to each class of
consumers." 20 3 This provision is in accord with existing case law, and as the
commission gains experience, rules may be promulgated which actually
codify the law in these cases. 20 4
CONCLUSION

Until the Public Utility Regulatory Act, Texas was the only state without a
utility regulatory agency. Much of the confusion and expense of regulating
utilities should be eliminated by this Act, but for the most part, it adopts
concepts already in use. Valuation of the utilities' property is to be based on
a ratio of both original and replacement costs; property included in the rate
base should be only that which is used by the utility to provide service. The
Act allows utilities to establish classifications of customers when setting
land 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (residents paid for the utility through their municipal taxes
while non-residents paid no city taxes).
199. Ford v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 141 Tex. 525, 527, 174 S.W.2d 479, 480
(1943); Gillam v. City of Fort Worth, 287 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Caldwell v. City of Abilene, 260 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, writ ref'd).
200. See Ford v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 141 Tex. 525, 528-30, 174 S.W.2d 479,
480-81 (1943).
201. Smith v. Public Util. Comm'n, 199 N.E. 179, 180 (Ohio 1935); C. PmLLIPS,
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION

202.
480-81
203.
204.

24-26 (1965).

See Ford v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 141 Tex. 525, 528-29, 174 S.W.2d 479,
(1943).
Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 721, § 38, at 2341.
Id. § 37, at 2341.
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individual rates, but they must charge all similarly situated customers equal
rates.
There is one significant departure from existing rate setting methods. The
Public Utility Regulatory Act defines the test year as the 12 months
immediately preceding the rate inquiry. This definition contradicts existing
law and a similar proposition was declared unconstitutional as being a
violation of due process. This clause could subvert the entire scheme of
responsive and equitable rate setting because by such an arbitrary choice of
the valuation period, abnormal business conditions might completely distort
resulting rates.
Considered in its entirety, however, the Act represents an important
milestone in the road to effective regulation of utilities and prevention of
abuse due to disjointed rate making procedures. The commission has the
power to govern utilities for the benefit of the people of Texas. The question
remains, however, as to whether the commission will exercise its power to
that effect.
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